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WHEN WORLDS COLLIDE: THE
UNEASY CONVERGENCE OF
CREATIVITY AND INNOVATION
DORIS ESTELLE LONG*

I've titled my presentation "When Worlds Collide: The Uneasy Convergence of Creativity and Innovation." What I want to focus on in this
discussion is the uneasy convergence of creativity and innovation, particularly in the areas of copyright and patent law and policy during the
latter decades of the 20th Century, and their ongoing implications for
rational intellectual property development today.
In 2003, at the Brace Memorial Lecture, Mary Beth Peters spoke
about the difficulty that copyright had in connection with the public's
view of copyright as largely obstructionist in nature, and she called the
Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act 1 a "pyrrhic victory."'2 She
suggests, and to a certain extent I agree, that this particular pyrrhic victory helped mobilize people against copyright, and lead to some of the
vehemence that we've seen over the past ten to twelve years regarding
the role copyright should play in restricting third party use. 3 As
*

Professor and Chair of the Intellectual Property, Information Technology and Pri-

vacy Group at The John Marshall Law School in Chicago. Juris Doctor from Cornell University. This Article is dedicated to Patricia Gerdes whose did early research in this field
for me and whose untimely death left a void in wit, wisdom and energy for all those who
knew her. As always, any errors belong solely to me.
1. Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827
(1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§108, 203, 301-304). Among other changes this Act extended
the term of protection for copyrighted works under U.S. law from a term of life plus fifty
years, to one for life plus 70 years. The change is codified in 17 U.S.C. §302 (2006).
2. Marybeth Peters, Copyright Enters the Public Domain, 51 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 710,
710 (2004).
3. Id. at 710 - 11. "Although the opposition to term extension was not very vocal prior
to its passage, the legislation turned out to be a poster child for critics of copyright law who
claimed that a captive Congress had enacted legislation that conferred a significant benefit
on copyright owners while harming the public interest in general by freezing the public
domain. Whatever the merits of term extension- and the merits in terms of copyright
principles were slim-term extension helped to mobilize an outcry against copyright law
that has gone on to address issues far beyond term extension itself. It launched one of the
first constitutional challenges to copyright law, and although that challenge was rejected
by the Supreme Court, other constitutional challenges have been mounted in its wake. The
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Marybeth Peters describes the problem:
Whatever the merits of term extension - and the merits in terms of
copyright principles were slim - term extension helped to mobilize an
outcry against copyright law [that] has gone on to address issues far
beyond term extension itself.... The day may come when even the most
aggressive copyright owner rues the day that term extension was
passed, because the fallout may 4outweigh whatever benefit copyright
owners might ultimately receive.
However, the difficulty didn't start with the Sonny Bono Copyright
Term Extension Act. 5 I believe the difficulty started when the Digital
Age first started. Everybody refers to the idea that "information wants
to be free."'6 Well, unfortunately, that freedom-seeking "information" has
turned into copyrightable expression and that copyrightable expression
has turned into the latest song that's just come out, or the latest movie.
We've started to expand the borders of what we think qualifies as "information" and made some of the demands that we make for informational
freedom on works that aren't really informational at all. In short, we've
ignored the distinctions between information and expression, and the
differential treatment required as a result of policy distinctions regarding access and protection.
I believe that where we first start to see the problems is way back in
the 1980s when computer software became widely available. At this
time U.S. and international law were trying to figure out: "What do we
do with this new thing called a computer software program? Where do
we put it?"
Before I progress any further into my discussion about the convergences between creativity and innovation, let's talk about definitions.
How do you define "creativity"? One potential definition is the copyright
version which says, "[i]t's a creative work if it's 'an original work of auday may come when even the most aggressive copyright owner rues the day that term
extension was passed, because the fallout may outweigh whatever benefit copyright owners
might ultimately receive." (footnotes omitted).
4. Id. at 710-11.
5. See Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, supra note 2.
6. This concept was originally attributed to Stewart Brand. See, e.g., STEWART BRAND,
THE MEDIA LAB: INVENTING THE FUTURE AT MIT 202 (1987). It has been mimicked in countless venues until it has become a virtual rallying cry for digital freedom. It is particularly
associated with the free content or free culture movements. See, e.g., John Perry Barlow,
Life Liberty and the Pursuit of Copyright, Round Two, THE ATLANTIC ONLINE, http://www.
theatlantic.com/unbound/forum/copyright/barlow2.htm (laying out some of the initial foundations of the free content/free culture movement). See generally, LAWRENCE LEssIG, THE

(Random House 2001)
(outlining some of the critical arguments of the free culture movement); SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, COPYRIGHTS AND COPYWRONGS: THE RISE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND How IT
FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMON IN A CONNECTED WORLD

THREATENS CREATIVITY (2001) (describing some of the critical issues of the free content/free

culture movements).
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thorship."' 7 The Encyclopedia Britannica (on-line version) defines creativity as "[the] ability to produce something new through imaginative
skill, whether a new solution to a problem, a new method or device, or a
new artistic object or form."8 Funk and Wagnalls defines creativity as
"creative power or faculty; ability to create" 9 while the Oxford English
Dictionary defines creativity as "the quality of being able to produce original work or ideas in any field."1 0
My favorite definition comes from Wikipedia, which my students tell
me is the font of all wisdom in the digital universe. "Creativity" is "a
mental process involving the generation of new ideas or concepts or new
u The most intriguing explanation of the creative
associations.""
process
by a recognized creative individual may be by Edward Albee. He said:
"The thing that makes a creative person, creative is to be creative and
that's all there is to it."1 2 That's beautifully circular. But it still doesn't
quite get me where I want to be. I want to know why people create. As
far as I am concerned, copyright exists largely to encourage the creation
of new works. 13 Consequently, if creativity is the font for deciding where
protection for copyright is supposed to be delineated, then we need to
figure out what causes creativity so that we can delimit copyright so that
its protection truly does promote creativity and goes no further.
"Innovation" is no easier to define. The dictionaries, however, come
a bit closer to the legal norm for innovation under patent law - "novelty,
7. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §101 (2006) (defining a copyrightable work under U.S. copyright
as "an original work of authorship fixed in a tangible medium of expression"). International law similarly requires some form of intellectual creation although fixation is a domestic law choice. See, e.g., Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, art. 10(2), Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 81 (defining copyright protectable compilations
of data and other materials as those "which by reason of the selection or arrangement of
their contents constitute intellectual creations") (emphasis added) [hereinafter "TRIPS"].
See also, Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art. 2(2),
Sept. 9, 1886, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 (revised July 24, 1971 and establishing
fixation as a domestic law choice) [hereinafter "Berne Convention"].
8. Creativity, Britannica On-Line Encyclopedia, http://www.britannica.com (last visited Nov. 24, 2008).
9. Creativity, FUNK & WAGNALLS
(Funk & Wagnalls Co. 1965).

STANDARD DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE

10. Creativity, SUPPLEMENT TO THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (Oxford 1972).
11. Wikipedia, Creativity, http://en.wikipedia.org/wikilCreativity (as of Nov. 20, 2008

21.17 GMT).
12. See, e.g., ROBERT J. STERNBERG, DUKE UNrv. TALENT ID. PROG., EXPERT'S FORUM:
DEVELOPING CREATIVITY, Duke Gifted Letter 1 (Summer 2001), http://www.dukegiftedlet-

ter.com/about-dgl/index.html (quoting Edward Albee).
13. See, e.g., U.S. CONST., art. I, §8, cl.8 (granting Congress the power to enact federal
copyright statutes "to promote the Progress of Science and the Useful Arts."). See generally, Doris Estelle Long, DissonantHarmonization: Limitations on Cash 'n Carry Creativity, 70 ALB. L. REV. 101 (2007).
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non-obviousness and utility. ' 14 Merriam-Webster's Online Dictionary defined "innovation" as "a new method, idea or device" and actually uses
the term "novelty" as part of its secondary meaning. 15 When we're sitting in the Intellectual Property field, we think of innovation and we connect it to patent law and the limits and the requirements of patents.
Interestingly though, once you take your head out of the intellectual
property arena and you start looking for innovation, in other areas, the
facial connection to patents rapidly disappears. "Innovation" is mentioned in the Millennium Development Goal Report on Science, Technology and Innovation Policy. 16 Yet "innovation" in this report has nothing
to do with patent law and everything to do with how do goods, services,
information, and knowledge are transformed so that they're moved out
into the marketplace. 17 Joseph Schumpeter defines innovation as "the
introduction of new goods, new methods of productions, the openings of
new markets, the conquest of new sources supply and the carrying out of
new organization of any industry."1 8 I don't see any patents necessarily
sitting within the confines of that definition, although they may play a
role.
The problem with the lack of a clear definitional distinction between
innovation and creativity is that it causes muddled thinking about the
purposes and boundaries of the two areas of law that have the most to do
with encouraging activity in these related areas of intellectual labor patents and copyrights, respectively. To date, I have discovered no
clearer information about any distinctions in creative versus innovative
processes from the scientific/sociological arena. While there have been
numerous reports both in the popular press and in countless scientific
journals regarding current efforts to identify the actual impulses towards creativity and innovation, the results have not yet reached a level
of clarity for our purposes. 1 9 They've done a lot of brain mapping of the
20
left hemisphere and the right hemisphere; they've done a lot of testing.
14. See 35 U.S.C. §§101 - 103 (2006) (establishing the three part test of novelty, nonobviousness and utility). This three part test is also reflected in international law. See
TRIPS, supra note 8, art. 27, Apr. 15, 1994 (establishing a tripartite test of newness, inventive step and industrial application for patentability).
15. Merriam-Webster's Online Dictionary, Innovation, http://www.merriam-webster.
com/dictionary/innovation (last visited Nov. 24, 2008) (second entry).
16. See, e.g., U.N. Dev. Prog., Millennium Project, Report of the Task Force on Science,
Technology and Innovation: Applying Knowledge in Development, Achieving the Millennium Development Goals (2005) (preparedby Calestous Juma and Lee Yee-Cheong) (discussing the critical role of entrepreneurism in sustainable innovation development).
17. Id.
18. JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 66 (Harvard Univ.
Press 1934).
19. See generally, Long, supra note 15.
20. Id.
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They've tried to come up with explanations for why people are creative or
what you have to have in order to be creative. 2 1 The problem is that we
haven't done a very good job of figuring out what distinctions, if any,
exist in the impulses toward creative versus innovative acts. When you
look at the current scientific journals, they don't distinguish between creative or aesthetic labor and innovative labor. They talk about creativity
and innovation in the same work with no effort to determine if there is a
distinction between the two, and if so, what that distinction might be.2 2
The absence of such studies makes it hard to determine how to structure
legal regimes that make sense to promote the types of activity they are
intended to promote, without unduly restricting the public's ability to
utilize the products of such creative and innovative activities.
Copyright and patent regimes were created to achieve two distinctly
different goals. When you think about copyright, it really is supposed to
be about promoting creativity. Not innovation, but creativity. There's a
difference in creativity versus innovation. Innovation is, by the nature of
its root word - innovate, the act of creating something that is inventive,
to come up with some new way of doing things. Copyright does not require the same level of newness. Its focus is not on novelty, but on the
unique expression an individual uses to discuss the same concept or idea
as another. Painting is not the result of scientific experimentation, just
as inventing the light bulb is not the result of creative expression.
The distinction between creativity and innovation is underscored by
the distinctly different legal systems crafted to protect them. Copyright
gives you a term of life of the author plus seventy years, a nice long term
of protection. 23 Patent law gives you twenty years. 2 4 There's a reason for
that shorter term. I believe part of it has to do with the view that the
inventions that are covered by patent are those inventions that we want
out in the public faster. That's why you get only twenty years. You don't
21. Id.
22. E.g., MIHALY CSIKSZENTMIHALYI, CREATIVITY: FLOW AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF DisCOVERY AND INVENTION (Harper Perennial 1996) The author describes ten polarities ten

"polarities," integration of which he determined was present in creative people. Id. Among
the people whom Dr. Csikszentmihalyi included within his study were artists, musicians,
actors, physicists, psychologists, and chemists. Id. at 12-14. He did not differentiate between aesthetic and innovative creative processes in reaching his conclusions. Id. at 12.
See generally, Long, supra note 15 (discussing the ongoing lack of scientific and psychological studies regarding the impulses toward creativity and innovation).
23. 17 U.S.C. §302 (2006) (establishing a general term of protection for copyrighted
works of life of the author plus 70 years).
24. 35 U.S.C. §154(2) (2006) (granting term of protection for 20 years, measured from
the application date). There are various bases on which a patent term can be extended,
such as those due to Patent Office delays which fail to issue a patent within three years of
application. 35 U.S.C. §154(b) (2006). Other delays may occur as a result of the federal
marketing approval process for certain substances under Federal Drug Administration obligations. 35 U.S.C. §156 (2006).
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get your life term. You don't get life plus fifty - the international term of
protection. 25 You get a short, non-renewable time period where the inventor has the right to control the use of her invention. Whereas creative works are by definition those works that are expressive in nature.
They're not information; you don't absolutely, positively have to have
them rapidly available to the general public. In fact, copyright protection doesn't even require a work to be publicly available at all for protec26
tion to attach.
From a paradigmatic point of view, the differences between copyright and patent protection make a lot of sense. We have a slight problem, however, because we have forgotten these differences. I would
suggest the problem of this unfortunate convergence between creativity
and innovation and the muddle that it has created in devising rational
boundaries in the area of copyright, started with software. When you
think about the development of copyright protection to various media, it
is a story of expansion. We went from paintings to photography, to motion pictures, to television, to satellite and finally to the Internet. Admittedly, copyright was always struggling to figure out whether these new
communication methods were a different media that needed a different
type of protection. With each development, we would expand our legal
definitions to cover these new media. 2 7 I would suggest, however, there
is something different about a television program versus a computer
software program. I'm going to make a further distinction. I only want to
talk about software that deals with application and operating systems.
Not video games. I think video games are closer to my television model.
Television programs may raise issues about permissive distribution in
the face of cable and satellite broadcasts, but they do not pose serious
issues about whether their content should qualify for copyright protection. Neither do the visual aspects of video games.
In the 1980s, when the U.S. Copyright Office ("Copyright Office")
was first faced with the protection of software, it treated software in
what I thought was an incredibly short sighted and overly technical
25. The Berne Convention only requires protection for a minimum period of the life of
the author plus 50 years. See Berne Convention, supra note 8, art. 7. But cf. Berne Convention, supra note 8, art. 7 (2)-(4) (providing for minimum terms of protection of 50 years for
cinematographic works; 50 years for anonymous and pseudonymous works; and 25 years
for works of applied art, respectively). U.S. domestic law provides for a term of protection
longer than the minimum term required under the Berne Convention. See 17 U.S.C. § 302
(2006) (providing for a term of protection of life of the author plus 70 years for most works).
26. See 17 U.S.C. §102 (2006) (establishing originality and fixation as the statutory
minimums for copyright protection, not publication).
27. See, e.g., Act of March 3, 1865, 13 Stat. 540 (photographs added to category of
works protected under U.S. copyright); Act of August 24, 1912, 37 Stat. 488 (motion pictures added to category of protected works); Act of December 12, 1980 (computer software
added to category of protected works).
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manner. It turns out the Copyright Office may have been right. Because
the Copyright Office's response was to require registration of the underlying code separately from the screen that users

saw. 2 8

If you think of a

video game model, when I'm looking at the pictures and playing the
game, I don't care what the code says. The marketing feature of the
game - what's valuable - is the picture on the screen. That picture on
the screen is no different from television or satellite images. It's merely a
new way to communicate what is clearly expressive content. It's when

you get to code that you have problems. When you consider code, it concerns stuff that is not expressive. It's functional; it makes a machine do

something.
If you think about the idea of "innovative" copyright, if you go back
and you do a search of U.S. law and you look for the use of the term
"innovation" in connection with a copyrighted work, the first case doesn't
appear until 1984,29 and it is, unsurprisingly enough, a case dealing
28. Under early Copyright Office rules, both audio-visual screen displays and the underlying text could be the subject of separate registrations. Subsequently, the Copyright
Office not only acknowledged that the audiovisual display of a video game could qualify as
a registrable work, subject to separate registration as an "audiovisual work," it actually
required the author to choose whether to register the work as an audio-visual work (thus
explicitly protecting the screen display) or as a text work (thus explicitly protecting the
source code). Under a Registration Decision regarding the "Registration and Deposit of
Computer Screen Displays" in a Federal Register announcement published on July 10,
1988, the Copyright Office declared its determination that "all copyrightable expression
owned by the same claimant and embodied in a computer program, or first published as a
unit with a computer program, including computer screen displays, is considered a single
work and should be registered on a single application form." Notice of Decision Concerning
Registration and Deposit of Computer Screen Displays, 53 Fed. Reg. 21817-01 (July 10,
1988). As a result of this decision, copyright owners must decide whether to register the
code as a text work, or the screen display as an audiovisual work. Id. The choice is based
on the author's determination of which is the "predominant authorship" at issue. Id. For
reasons discussed in the subsequent text, in hindsight, I now believe this decision signaled
a proper recognition that the visual (and more clearly copyright governable) aspects of a
computer program are separable from its code. I do not mean to suggest that visual elements may not also qualify as functional or at least as so lacking in expressive content as to
fall outside the scope of copyright protection. See, e.g., Lotus Development Corp. v. Boland
Int'l Inc., 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995), affd per curiam, 65 S.Ct. 1062 (1996) (finding that a
command hierarchy for a computer spread sheet program qualified as unprotected method
of operation). But at least visual elements of a screen display, particularly in the context of
a video game are more likely to be expressive as opposed to functional, and, therefore, more
properly the focus of concern for a law designed to encourage creativity as opposed to
innovation.
29. The first reported case to use the term "innovation" in a copyright case is Khan v.
Leo Feist, Inc. 70 F. Supp. 450 (S.D.N.Y. 1947). The case involved a claim for copyright
infringement of the song "Rum and Coca Cola," but the reference to "innovation" appears
directed to the lack of novel issues in the case. Id. By contrast, in E.F. Johnson Co. v.
Uniden Corp. of America, the court actually uses the term "innovation" to refer to the computer program sought to be protected, and stated: "Of course, it is true that because "[t]he
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with computer software. Once software was placed into copyright, in the
1980s, we start seeing plenty of case law that associates copyright and
innovation. I came up with over eight hundred and sixteen cases to date
on a very narrow search that combined copyright with innovation as part
of the discussion of rights and processes. Something happened in the
1980s and I think that 'something' is tied to the fact that we took something that was not expressive and dumped it into copyright. And we ended up with battles that now link something that had to do with
creativity to innovation. It makes a difference.
When the National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works ("CONTU") recommended including software in the revised 1976 Act, 30 the amended 1976 Act defined a computer program as:
"A set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a
computer."3 1 It isn't poetry; it isn't a novel; it isn't music. Computer
software is a set of instructions.Worse yet, computer software isn't just a
set of instructions, such as how to play a game, 32 it is a set of instruccomputer software industry progresses by a stepping-stone improvement process, with
each innovation building on past innovations to produce an improved product," Note, Copyrighted ComputerPrograms,68 MINN. L. REV. 1264, 1291 (1984), too loose an application of
the substantial similarity test in this field could inhibit salutary innovation by in effect
requiring software engineers to "'reinvent the wheel" in order to achieve technological progress." Id. 623 F. Supp. 1485 (D. Minn. 1985) (emphasis added; citations in original).
The earliest reported U.S. case using the term "innovative" to describe a copyrighted
work is Digital CommunicationsAssociates, Inc. v. Softklone Distributing Corp., in which
the court is faced with a claim of copyright infringement of the status display screen for
plaintiffs communication software. 659 F. Supp. 449 (N.D. Ga. 1987). In analyzing the
protectable nature of this screen, the court stated: "Although some courts have stated that
the meaning of Baker v. Selden is that blank forms cannot be copyrighted, this circuit, like
the majority of courts that have considered the issue, has rejected this position and instead
have held that blank forms may be copyrighted if they are sufficiently innovative that their
arrangement of information is itself informative. Apple Computer, Inc., 714 F.2d at 1250."
Id. at 461. (emphasis and citations in original; bolding added). The term "innovative" is an
explanatory addition by the court and demonstrates how quickly copyright became "infected" with "innovation" analogues upon the addition of computer software as a protectable work under copyright.
30. Not all CONTU members supported strong copyright protection for software. Commissioner John Hersey stated: "[The CONTU majority's] metaphor [treating programs like
ordinary printed instructions] does not hold up beyond a certain point. Descriptions and
printed instructions tell human beings how to use materials or machinery to produce desired results. In the case of computer programs, the instructions themselves eventually
become an essential part of the machinery that produces the results . . Printed instructions tell how to do; programs are able to do." THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, FINAL REPORT 58 (1978), available at http://digital-

law-online.info/CONTU/contul.html.
31. 17 U.S.C. §101 (2006) (defining "computer program").
32. See Morrissey v. The Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675 (1st Cir. 1967) (finding
game instructions potentially copyrightable so long as the rules of the contest are not so
narrow that "the topic necessarily requires, if not only one form of expression, at best only
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tions that causes something to happen. The problem occurs because we
added into copyright something that was more functional than
expressive.
I don't mean to suggest that functional works haven't been a part of
the copyright realm before. Even the first federal copyright statute covered charts and maps, which are undoubtedly functional works. 33 But
the functionality in these works is distinctly different. It is an informational functionality. Computer programs, by contrast, go beyond information to the actual functioning of the computer. Suddenly, with the
introduction of computer software into copyright we become worried
about stopping people from using something that is a new technology as
opposed to a new mode of expression. Then the cases begin to borrow
phrases in order to deal with this new convergence.
The difficulty is, when innovation is coupled with copyright, issues
such as the right to use a copyrighted work emerge. "Use" was previously never a right under copyright. Under copyright, the author had
specific rights whose authorization he could control: the right to
reproduce, distribute, adapt, publicly perform, and publicly display the
work. 34 The author couldn't control your ability to "use" the work. If a
work was publicly available, she couldn't stop you from reading a copy of
her work, or using the information in that work in whatever way you
desired. Now we have electronic access rights that, in essence, give copyright owners the right to put electronic fences around their works. 3 5 And
these fences are not required to exist simply to prohibit the unauthorized
copying of the work - a right recognized under copyright - but may be
used to prohibit access to the work itself.36
The problem is what I call the "Heaven help us the Supreme Court
got on the innovation bandwagon" problem. All of a sudden we find pat-

a limited number" and where protecting such expression "could exhaust all possibilities of
future use of the substance").
33. See Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124, 124 (repealed 1802) (listed protected works under the first federal copyright statute maps, charts and books).
34. See generally 17 U.S.C. §106 (2006) (listing the exclusive rights granted copyright
owners under U.S. law).
35. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C.§ 1201, et seq. (2006) (providing for protection of technological
protection measures to protect copyrightable works from unauthorized uses by prohibiting
their unauthorized circumvention). The protection for such "electronic fences" is so strong
that no statutory fair use exception permits circumvention except in the narrowly defined
case where the person seeking to use a copyrighted work for a fair use purpose is capable of
circumventing the protection measure without outside assistance. 17 U.S.C. §1201(b)
(2006).
36. 17 U.S.C. §1201(a) (2006) (prohibiting circumvention of technological protection
measures that "effectively controls access to a work protected under this title").
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ent values in copyright cases. We borrow contributory infringement. 37

Maybe that was a good idea. Maybe it should have been in the copyright
statute. Then, however, we borrow the concepts of "staple articles of
commerce" 38 and "active inducement. '3 9 These concepts may make
37. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) The
Supreme Court analogizes to statutory prohibition of contributory infringement under patent law to find similar prohibition under copyright law, and states: "There is no precedent
in the law of copyright for the imposition of vicarious liability on such a theory. The closest
analogy is provided by the patent law cases to which it is appropriate to refer because of the
historic kinship between patent law and copyright law." Id. at 439. The Court nevertheless recognizes in footnote 19: "The two areas of the law, naturally, are not identical twins,
and we exercise the caution which we have expressed in the past in applying doctrine formulated in one area to the other." Id. at 439 n.19. My contention is that in the adoption of
certain problematic tests from the patent side of the IP house, such as "staple article of
commerce" and "active inducement," the Court failed to strike the appropriate balance between innovative necessity under patent law and creative necessity under copyright.
While Congressional grant power for both copyright and patent legislation resides in the
same clause seeking "to promote the progress of Science and the Useful Arts." U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The policy goals behind the two are distinctly different. Accord Sony Corp.,
464 U.S. at 439 n.19.
38. Id. at 788-89. By statute, U.S. patent law expressly exempts from liability for contributory infringement sellers of "a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for
substantial noninfringing use." 35 U.S.C. §271(c) (2006). While the Court acknowledged
the differences between patent and copyright law, it nevertheless adopted this statutory
patent exception into the realm of creativity, stating: "We recognize there are substantial
differences between the patent and copyright laws. But in both areas the contributory infringement doctrine is grounded on the recognition that adequate protection of a monopoly
may require the courts to look beyond actual duplication of a device or publication to the
products or activities that make such duplication possible. The staple article of commerce
doctrine must strike a balance between a copyright holder's legitimate demand for effective-not merely symbolic-protection of the statutory monopoly, and the rights of others
freely to engage in substantially unrelated areas of commerce. Accordingly, the sale of copying equipment, like the sale of other articles of commerce, does not constitute contributory
infringement if the product is widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable purposes. Indeed,
it need merely be capable of substantial non-infringing uses." Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 788 89. The impact of this exception in the arena of copyright, with its statutory rights of fair
use, which do not exist under patent law, remains hotly contested. See 17 U.S.C. §107
(2006); Metro Goldwyn Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005) (Breyer,
J., concurring and Ginsburg, J. concurring separately) (disagreeing as to whether the Grokster file sharing software meets the demands of the Sony Corp. staple article of commerce
test under copyright).
39. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. at 936. The Court adopted the active inducement test for
copyright, stating:
For the same reasons that Sony took the staple-article doctrine of patent law as a
model for its copyright safe-harbor rule, the inducement rule, too, is a sensible one
for copyright. We adopt it here, holding that one who distributes a device with the
object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or
other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts
of infringement by third parties.
Id. According to the court the "inducement rule" was "codified" in Section 271 of the patent
laws. Id. at 936-37 and 936 n.ll. This section, in particular, provides that "Whoever ac-
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sense in the context of innovative content, where the public policy goal is
make the content available faster so that the information contained in
such content moves into the public domain more quickly. On the other
hand, goals like the rapid dedication to the public - which is a hallmark
of patent law, with its obligations of disclosure, recordation and limited
term protection 40 - don't make a lot of sense in the context of, for example, music and video games. When you consider creative expression, regardless of how "novel" or "innovative" such expression may appear,
41
different protection goals come into play.
I think it's kind of fun though that we copyright lawyers have gotten
our own back because copyright has now infected patent law, with what
may turn out to be equally uncomfortable results. You can thank us for
the references to Footnote Ten in the Campbell case 42 and to Tasini4 3 in
the recent MercExchange decision, 4 4 where the Supreme Court relied on
tively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer." 35 U.S.C. §271(c)
(2006) (emphasis added). Yet, similar to the "staple article of commerce" test, this active
inducement test may prove problematic in its application to copyright. See Grokster, Ltd.,
545 U.S. at 936; Lynda J. Oswald, The Intent Element of "Inducement to Infringe" Under
PatentLaw: Reflections on Grokster,13 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 225 (2006) (detailing the development of the active inducement standard and its checkered history).
40. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 111 - 122 (2006) (detailing patent application requirements under
U.S. law).
41. See Long, supra note 15.
42. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578, n.10 (1994) ("Because the
fair use enquiry often requires close questions of judgment as to the extent of permissible
borrowing in cases involving parodies (or other critical works), courts may also wish to bear
in mind that the goals of the copyright law, "to stimulate the creation and publication of
edifying matter," are not always best served by automatically granting injunctive relief
when parodists are found to have gone beyond the bounds of fair use...") (citations

omitted).
43. N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 505 (2001). The Court in dicta indicated
that injunctive relief may not always be desirable, stating:
[I]t hardly follows from today's decision that an injunction against the inclusion of
these articles in the databases (much less all freelance articles in any databases)
must issue. See 17 U.S.C. § 502(a) (court "may" enjoin infringement); Campbell v.
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578, n. 10 (1994) (goals of copyright law are
"not always best served by automatically granting injunctive relief'). Id. (citations
in original).
44. Ebay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 392-93 (2006). "[T]his Court has
consistently rejected invitations to replace traditional equitable considerations with a rule
that an injunction automatically follows a determination that a copyright has been infringed. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 505 (2001) (citing Campbell
v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578, n.10 (1994)); Dun v. Lumbermen's Credit
Assn., 209 U.S. 20, 23-24 (1908)). Id. (citations in original). I do not mean to suggest that
this is the only instance of patent borrowing from copyright. To the contrary, the Supreme
Court's treatment of the active inducement test for contributory infringement under copyright has been cited in patent law decisions. See, e.g., Golden Blount, Inc. v. Robert H.
Peterson Co., 438 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Grokster to support its finding of contributory infringement under patent law).
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copyright "analogues" to support the suggestion that injunctive relief
may be inappropriate for patents, in certain cases. Blame copyright.
Patent law finally was polluted by copyright's creativity and speech concerns drifting over into the innovation stream. Whether or not the ultimate determination that injunctive relief is not always available in cases
of patent infringement is a good idea; however, the point is, for purposes
of this discussion, we're still not focusing on the distinctions between innovation and creativity and the impact the differing public policy concerns may have on the cross-applicability of the legal doctrines developed
under copyright and patent law. We have to be certain that our choices
to adopt one another's rules are rational ones, in keeping with the ultimate public policy goals of the intellectual property law in question.
One of the issues you could raise is whether all of this focus on innovation versus creativity is really nothing more than some ridiculously
legalistic distinction with little relevance to the real issues facing us in
connection with intellectual property in the Age of Convergence. I don't
think so because, when you think about software, and the emergence of
innovation language in the debate over copyright, it becomes clear that
innovation concerns have had an adverse effect on the debates over the
shape of rational copyright protection for the Digital Age. We went from
"I want access to innovation and technology because I need to know how
to build the bridges, or the best ways to plow the fields, or how to make
and use effective medicines," to the demand to access to works simply
because "I need to have my own music when I want it on my machine; I
want my MTV and I want it now."
I'm sorry, but I actually do think there is a difference between the
operating software you may need to operate your computer, and music,
or even a movie. One you'd like to have, the other you might actually
need in order to participate fully in today's global digital environment.
The problem is, the arguments about the expensiveness of intellectual
property based goods, and the negative role that copyright is perceived to
play in the creation of new works, gained a great deal of credence on the
software side of the copyright house. When you look at 20th Century
globalization and the debates over copyright protection during the latter
decades of that century, there were plenty of arguments made in favor of
weak or virtually non-existent protection of copyrights. 4 5 The strongest
argument, in my opinion, or the one that seemed to have the most traction, particularly in the developing world, was that software is quite
45. See, e.g., ROSEMARY J.
AUTHORSHIP,

COOMBE, THE CULTURAL LIFE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES:

APPROPRIATION, AND THE LAW 6 (Duke University Press 1998) (describing the

adverse impact of intellectual property protection on indigenous creativity); JAMES BOYLE,
& SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY
(Harvard University Press 1997) (one of the early works analyzing the problems posed by
intellectual property protection in the Information Age).
SHAMANS, SOFTWARE
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simply overpriced. Because copyright is used to protect software, then
copyright must be bad because it helps companies sell overpriced goods.
All of a sudden music is overpriced. Books are overpriced. Anything that
is copyright protectable becomes overpriced and therefore the proper
subject of pirate activities. In essence, piracy becomes an ethical choice
in response to the greed of the copyright owner in charging too much for
46
his goods.

One approach I have suggested in other fora is decoupling actual
needs from desired needs to determine a rational basis for limiting copy47
right protection based on educational or technological necessities.

What I'd like to focus on here is an approach that I call "Back to the
Future. '48 Let's go back to some of the ideas that made sense in the past
and use them to make sense of the future. First of all, copyright is supposed to be about creativity. If you have functional language, if you have

code that truly just makes something (a computer) do something (operate), it shouldn't be protected by copyright. I'm not convinced that operating software should be protected by patent because the prior art
questions are horrendous. 4 9 Operating software, however, ought to be in

patents as opposed to being in copyright. Therefore, move copyright
back to expression and as a result, remove some of the fun dances we
have done on "thin" copyrights 50 or when determining whether reverse

engineering is fair or not. 5 1 Think about it. If it's on the patent side, in
46. For an interesting popular exchange on the ethics of piracy, see Chad Perrin: SOB,
http://sob.apotheon.org/?p=143 (Sept. 16, 2006, 01:57 EST). One of the difficulties in the
argument regarding the cheaper prices at which pirated goods is offered is that pirate
goods must always be cheaper because many of the costs associated with the creation of
new works, including those for research and development, are never incurred by pirates.
Pirates also never incur the secondary costs associated with creating a market for their
products, including advertising costs to create a demand for them. They also never incur
the costs of replacement or warranty service since they never have to guarantee the safety
or functionality of their goods.
47. See Doris Estelle Long, Presentation on TRIPS and Copyright: Lost Legacies and
Future Visions at International Conference on Impact of TRIPS-INDO-US Experience, (December 15, 2006) (copy on file with author) [hereinafter Lost Legacies].
48. With apologies to Robert Zemeckis, director of the classic film distributed by Universal Studios of the same name.
49. Given the unfortunate fit between patent and software due largely to present difficulties in effective determination of prior art, the ultimate choice may be to establish a sui
generis form of protection for software. Cf Peer to Patent, http://www.peertopatent.org
(establishing a pilot program in conjunction with the USPTO to allow peer review of participating software patent applicants to provide applicable prior art), see infra notes 61 - 62.
50. See, e.g., Satva v. Lowry, 323 F.3d 805 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding that accurate glass
sculptures ofjellyfish were copyrightable but subject only to a "thin copyright" which could
only be infringed by a direct reproduction).
51. Compare Sega Enter. Ltd. v. Accolade Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding
intermediate copying of plaintiffs software "to discover the functional requirements for
compatibility" qualified as a fair use) with E.U. Directive on the Legal Protection of Com-
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other words the innovation side of the IP house, the answer should be "of
course reverse engineering is fair." You're allowed to invent around a
patent. To the extent that you are reverse engineering to learn how the
code works, you should be entitled to do so under patent. 5 2 Thus, by
placing software within patents we solve some nasty problems under
copyright in connection with code protection.
The other problem we solve is the claim that the copyright term is
too long. 5 3 Why is it too long? Arguably, because software has a short

shelf life. I agree. Software should not be protected for life plus fifty (the
international minimum term of protection under Berne 54 and TRIPS 5 5 ).

If anything, put it in for a shorter term such as for life plus twenty, or the
even shorter 20-year patent grant for innovative works.
The next argument you frequently hear is that copyrighted works
should be registered. 56 Because in patents you have to register; you
have to apply for patent protection. Once you do, we take a look at your
described invention, we decide if it's worthwhile, if it meets our high
standards of novelty and non-obviousness, 5 7 and, if it does, we give you a
puter Software, art. 5(3) & 6 (permitting reverse engineering, including decompilation "to

observe, study or test the functioning of the program in order to determine the ideas and
principles which underlie any element of the program" and for interoperability).

52. Unfortunately, nothing is ever simple in intellectual property. Admittedly, one of
the problems with reverse engineering of software if it were placed within patent law is the
ridiculously narrow experimental exception under present law that in my opinion seriously
reduces the ability of certain parties to engage in legitimate reverse engineering activities.
See Madey v. Duke University, 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ("[Rlegardless of
whether a particular institution or entity is engaged in an endeavor for commercial gain, so
long as the act is in furtherance of the alleged infringer's legitimate business and is not
solely for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly philosophical inquiry, the act
does not qualify for the very narrow and strictly limited experimental use defense.").
53. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, on my bad grades in software: An Appeal, Lessig 2.0,
http://www.lessig.org/blog/archives/cooper.shtml (advocating a ten year term of protection
for copyrighted works generally); Rufus Pollock, Forever Minus A Day? Some Theory And
Empirics Of Optimal Copyright, available at http://www.rufuspollock.org/economics/papers/optimal copyright.pdf (advocating a maximum 15 year, non-renewable term of
protection).
54. Berne Convention, supra note 8, art. 7 (providing generally that the minimum
term of protection "shall be the life of the author and fifty years after his death").
55. TRIPS, supra note 8, art. 9(1) & 10(1) (incorporating Berne Convention terms of
protection and making computer code a literary work under the Berne Convention;
respectively).
56. See, e.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (Harvard University Press 2003) (describing the positive im-

pact recordation could have on tracking and clearance costs).
57. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101 - 103 (2006) (requiring novelty, non-obviousness and utility for a
patent to be granted under U.S. law. See also TRIPS, supra note 8, art. 27(1) (requiring
patent protection for inventions which meet the requirements of newness, inventiveness
and industrial application).
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nice, short 20-year term of protection. 58 In copyright we don't require
registration except for American authors who seek to litigate to protect

their rights. 5 9 Do you know why? Think how unfair it is to foreign authors. The argument for a registration requirement for copyright not
only ignores international obligations, 60 it totally ignores any idea of allowing everybody to come in and protect their copyrighted works. Because when you advocate for registration, the first people you're kicking
out of the system are everybody who's not a national in this country,
unless you're talking about a large multinational corporation as the

owner. The struggling artist in Africa isn't going to know about the need
for registration to protect his works in the United States. So we've ignored the fundamental idea of opening up copyright by removing the formalities 6 1 and instead we've grabbed some of those formalities back. All

because we're dealing with the type of work that shouldn't be in
copyright.
I would also suggest that from a development perspective, instead of

fighting over piracy of musical works and films, let's focus the discussion
on the scope of protection, or more importantly, the exceptions that
should be allowed for software. Let's decouple creativity and innovation;

go "Back to the Future" and recognize the distinctions.
I would suggest another reason why the distinction matters. I'm
willing to make mistakes when it comes to patent law because those mistakes have a different impact as a direct result of the distinction between
58. 35 U.S.C. §154(2) (2006).
59. Only creation and fixation are required for U.S. authors to obtain copyright protection. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2006) ("Copyright protection subsists .
in original works of
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed. .. ")
(emphasis added). Registration is not an obligation for "protection" of copyright. 17 U.S.C.
§408(a) (2006) ("[R]egistration is not a condition of copyright protection."). However, in
order to seek relief through civil litigation, registration is required for US authors as a
matter of subject matter jurisdiction. See 17 U.S.C. § 411 (2006) ("[N]o action for infringement of copyright in any US work shall be instituted until the registration of a copyright
claim has been made in accordance with this title."); Strategy Source, Inc. v. Lee, 233 F.
Supp.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (requiring registration as a matter of subject matter jurisdiction
for copyright enforcement demands for US authored works).
60. Under Berne Convention Article 5(2), no formalities, including the obligation of
registration, may be imposed on foreign authors of copyrighted works. See Berne, supra
note 8, art. 5(2). This obligation has been incorporated into TRIPS, further demonstrating
not only the status of non-registration of copyright as a critical international standard, but
also the potential for trade sanctions if the obligation is violated. See TRIPS, supra note 8,
art. 9(1); cf. Panel Report, United States - Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act, WT/
DS160/R (Apr. 16, 1999) (U.S. was found in violation of TRIPS obligations under Article 13
as a result of exemptions from music performance licensing obligations for certain restaurants and bars).
61. See Berne Convention, supra note 8, art. 5(2) ("The enjoyment and the exercise of
these rights [under copyright] shall not be subject to any formality."). These formalities
include recordation and notice requirements. Id.
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the innovative and the creative processes. I don't mean to suggest that
innovative people are not talented, creative people. They certainly are.
But what I'm suggesting is, if you look at history, innovation is not a oneshot deal. If you don't invent the cure for the common cold, someone will.
If we screw it up and we don't have the right legal incentives under patent law to encourage people to work on an invention, innovation still occurs. Individual efforts may hasten the speed of innovation, admittedly a
critical concern when we are talking about health, safety and environmental issues. I am not saying that Einstein's individual genius wasn't
responsible for some tremendous leaps in innovation during last century,
but the discovery of the cure for the common cold does not per se require
the genius of a particular individual. Go back and look at ancient civilizations; they had brain surgery. 6 2 We may have lost the techniques over
time, but we re-discovered them. A lot of encouraging innovation is simply trying to create incentives for people to invest the time, money, and
effort to invent more quickly.
Now think about any single voice that is silenced because they're not
encouraged to paint, compose their music, or do what we traditionally
think of as creating expressive works. That's a loss. You don't want to
screw up on the creativity side. You don't merely delay creativity. You
stop it. Who knows what voice you may have silenced by your mistakes.
And since every voice is unique, we will never have the opportunity to
hear it at a later date. A voice once silenced will be lost forever. The
stakes on the side of creativity are extremely high.
What should the future be? I have to tell you I hate sui generis systems. Because I think a sui generis system is a great way to screw things
up. I remember the Semiconductor Chip Act.6 3 Talk about something
that was a disaster. From the international side of the house, we have
the Database Directive of the E.U., 64 yet another example of an ill-considered sui generis system. One of the reasons sui generis systems are
problematic is because you don't have a predicate for them. We don't
know what the tests are. We don't know what the standards are. We
don't know how they're going to work. I would suggest for software, if
we're not going to put it over in the patent side of the IP house, which I
62. See, e.g., Prehistoric Inca Neurosurgery, Neurophilosophy (May 13, 2008), available at http://scienceblogs.com/neurophilosophy/2008/05/prehistoric-peruvian trepanati.php
(detailing recent studies by American anthropologists regarding brain surgery techniques
during ancient Incan civilization).
63. Semi-conductor Chip Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 98-620, 98 Stat. 3347 (codified in
17 U.S.C. §§ 901 - 914) (protecting mask works fixed in semi-conductor chips - potentially
useful articles outside the scope of copyright - by combining registration with originality
requirements).
64. Council Directive 96/9, 1996 O.J. (L77) (EC) (establishing a sui generis system for
protecting databases that do not qualify for copyright protection based on the substantiality of the investment in time, money and effort expended).
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am not convinced makes a great deal of sense given the problems with
prior art examination, 6 5 then we should create a sui generis system to
meet the dual demands of innovation and information access posed by
software code. When it comes to copyright, take out all the language in
the statute that provides protection for code. Let's recognize that when it
comes to code, there should not be protection of the code qua code on the
copyright side of the house. 6 6 It doesn't fit; it's far too functional. Go
somewhere else for legal protection.
Admittedly, if this proposal is to have teeth, there are some treaties
we are going to have to undo and one of them is going to be TRIPS, because it managed to place software under the literary works protection
umbrella of Berne. 6 7 There is a bit of backtracking that must be done. I
would suggest that the innovation principles of patents or a sui generis
regime make more sense for software code, than the creativity concerns
of copyright.
Pam Samuelson and Jerry Reichman (among others) a long time ago
suggested that we needed sui generis protection for software premised, in
part, on a recognition of its functional nature. 68 They were right. Copyright is an unhappy fit for all of the reasons I've outlined. This issue is
going to be particularly critical for third world development. There are
certain software and certain application systems to which developing
countries must have inexpensive access. How many people right now
have been typing on their computers, or have gone to the Internet and
checked their e-mail? You need to have access to the technology that
runs these systems if you have any hope of participating in the Digital
Age. You need access to certain types of operational software. At a minimum, you need access to operating software and to certain basic application programs, such as word processing and spreadsheet creation. At
least for developing countries, we should consider a different model for
software protection that recognizes these needs and strikes the appropri69
ate balance between protection, compulsory licensing, and fair use.
65. It is too soon to tell what impact the pilot program Peer to Patent, allowing peer
review of self-selected software patent applicants to provide applicable prior art to the
USPTO, will have on the utility of prior art examinations by the USPTO. See supra note 6.
66. I'm not suggesting you can't protect the screen display qua screen display through
registration as an audio-visual work. If such protection collaterally protects code, such incidental protection is far preferable to the wholesale potential protection of code that exists
under present copyright regimes.
67. See supra note 52.
68. Pamela Samuelson et al., A Manifesto Concerningthe Legal Protectionof Computer
Programs,94 COLUM. L. REV. 2308, 2314 (1994) ("Although programs are texts and their
texts can be valuable, the most important property of programs is their behavior (i.e., the
set of results brought about when program instructions are executed).").
69. See Long, supra note 49. I am not advocating a certain level of protection or lack of
protection in this Article. I am merely suggesting that we need to address these issues in a
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First of all, shorten the term of protection. Pull software code out of
copyright so that we aren't controlled by the life term model, 70 and
shorten the term. Second, since it's an innovative work, provide the
same type of broad experimental rights that are permitted under patent
law, allowing individuals to invent around the code at issue, even to the
point of creating competitive products. In this sui generis system, I
would have broader rights than U.S. patent law, because, as I've indicated earlier,7 1 I think their experimental use is a little narrow to say
the least. Broaden the experimental use rights for software code. Acknowledge that there is a right to reverse engineer. It's an innovation
model, like patents so of course there should be that right.
Despite the problems I've already indicated with obligations under
72
Berne and TRIPS regarding registration rights for computer software,
in the new sui generis model, I would still require registration so that the
code has to go through some sort of review. If we actually decide to grant
exclusive rights to the owner of the intellectual property in the code, it
must be because it does something in a new way. It meets goals of innovation that should be at the heart of any protection decision in this area.
In order to avoid any conflict with U.S. treaty obligations, at a minimum, we must allow code created by foreign authors to be protected
without registration. 73 Such a limitation undeniably weakens the effectiveness of the sui generis system because it avoids what I perceive to be
a critical element of this system - review to assure that only inventive
(innovative) code is protected.
Moreover, because the goal of this new regime is to protect code as
an innovative work, the test for such a system must be more than the
relatively low standard of originality required under copyright and dirational manner as part of an overall review of copyright limitations and exceptions in the
Digital Age.
70. See TRIPS, supra note 8, art. 9(1) &10(1); Landes & Posner, supra note 57.
71. See Landes & Posner, supra note 57.
72. See Lessig, supra note 54; Pollock, supra note 54.
73. Cf. 17 U.S.C. §§ 408(a), 411 (2006) (requiring registration as a basis for copyright
enforcement for U.S. authors, while allowing foreign authors to register on an optional
basis). I also do not foresee any treaty violations if foreign authors are encouraged to register by the granting of certain special evidentiary benefits of registration, such as a rebuttable presumption of validity, or other such recordation based benefits , so long as such
benefits do not violate the national treatment obligation of the Berne Convention and
TRIPS. Cf 17 U.S.C. § 412 (2006) (premising an award of statutory damages or attorney's
fees on registration). See Berne Convention, supra note 8, art. 5(3) ("[W]hen the author is
not a national of the country of origin of the work for which he is protected under this
Convention, he shall enjoy in that country the same rights as national authors."); TRIPS,
supra note 8, art. 3 (requiring "treatment no less favourable [to non-nationals] than [the
Member] accords to its own nationals with regard to the protection of intellectual
property...").
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rected toward determining protection on the basis of creativity. 74 Unfortunately, if we establish a higher standard than originality, we threaten
to run afoul of the obligation under TRIPS that computer software be
protected under copyright. 75 The only present solution to this conundrum is to use the same system we use to solve the registration problem
- require participation by U.S. authors of code and permit continued copyright-style protection for foreign authored programs. We need a better
solution, but at least this type of optional registration system may be a
start toward ending the unfortunate convergences of creativity and innovation caused by inclusion of software code within the strictures of copyright protection.
Short of that, this muddle about what actually qualifies as innovation and what qualifies as creativity will continue. Given that muddle it's
going to be impossible to deal with the new works that are on the Internet in a logical fashion because we're already confusing creativity and
innovation, which doesn't help anybody. Let's remove the language of innovation from the legal regime of copyright so that decisions on the scope
of copyright in the Digital Age can be based on the needs of creative access - and not on the confusion of creativity with innovative labor and
functional information needs. It's time to stop the convergences, untie
the Gordian knot, and to mix yet another metaphor, stop the collisions.
If we stop tormenting copyright with the twisted reasoning needed to
protect non-visual aspects of computer software, and, dare I suggest,
other functional works as well, we may be able to deal rationally with the
real needs of access in today's converging, digital, global economy.
74. See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 358 (1991) (defining originality as requiring "some minimal level of creativity").
75. Article 10(1) of TRIPS specifically requires the treatment of computer software as a
literary work under the Berne Convention. See TRIPS, supra note 8, art. 10(1) ("Computer
programs, whether in source or object code, shall be protected as literary works under the
Berne Convention (1971)."). As such they are arguably subject to the originality obligation
under U.S. domestic law.

672

JOURNAL OF COMPUTER & INFORMATION LAW

[Vol. XXV

